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Uses of International 




Governments with strict control over the information that their citizens 
hear from foreign sources are regular targets of human rights pressure, but 
we know little about how this information matters in the domestic realm. I 
argue that authoritarian regimes strategically pass on certain types of external 
pressure to their public to “internationalize” human rights violations, making 
citizens view human rights in terms of defending their nation internationally 
rather than in terms of individual violations, and making them more likely 
to be satisfied with their government’s behavior. I find strong support for 
this model through statistical analysis of Chinese state media reports of 
external human rights pressure and a survey experiment on Chinese citizens’ 
responses to pressure on women’s rights. This analysis demonstrates that 
authoritarian regimes may be able to manipulate international human 
rights diplomacy to help them retain the support of their population while 
suppressing their human rights.
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In its annual report on China in January 2012, Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
called China an “authoritarian one-party state that imposes sharp curbs on 
freedom of expression, association, and religion.” Instead of censoring these 
denunciations, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) mouthpiece, the 
People’s Daily, devoted a surprising amount of attention to the report and 
reserved a large proportion of space for the organization’s condemnations of 
the CCP’s respect for human rights. An article on the 27th detailed HRW’s 
admonishments of forced relocation in Tibet, directly quoting the observa-
tion that “80% of the population of Tibet—including all herdsmen and 
nomads—were moved elsewhere” (People’s Daily, 2012b; 2012). Another 
article the next day discussed the report’s criticisms of forced confessions, 
failures to respect defendants’ rights, and the widespread use of torture 
(People’s Daily, 2012a; 2012).
None of the responses shied away from informing the public of HRW’s 
detailed criticisms of the Chinese government’s policies on sensitive issues—
criticisms that it is hard to imagine Chinese citizens would have heard about 
through other sources, given the limited international media coverage. 
Despite an extensive censorship system and Internet firewall, the CCP has 
regularly appeared to actively pass these kinds of otherwise unremarkable 
foreign exposures of the country’s human rights situation on for public con-
sumption. As I demonstrate in this piece, the People’s Daily has, between 
1979 and 2011, reported at least 228 separate instances of international pres-
sure over human rights in China in its pages, many as unremarkable as that 
from HRW.
Given that autocrats are hardly renowned for their willingness to enter-
tain criticism, this behavior is something of a puzzle. What exactly are they 
choosing to pass on to their citizens and why? How do these citizens 
respond?
Understanding the impact of this critical information on the domestic pub-
lic is especially relevant in authoritarian states, not just because of the pecu-
liar control that leaders have over the information, but because these countries 
are more often than not the target of public invocations from the international 
community. In 2016, for example, eight of the nine countries targeted for 
country-specific draft resolutions by the United Nations Human Rights 
Council were countries with “not free” media,1 five of which were in the 
world’s worst eight offenders. For China, since Deng Xiaoping’s government 
cracked down on protestors on June 4, 1989, the international human rights 
community has singled out the country for intense and very public scrutiny. 
China has faced economic and military sanctions, as well as regular condem-
nation from Western leaders, parliaments, media, nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), and the UN (Foot, 2000).
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And even in these more authoritarian states, public opinion can have a 
powerful effect on whether the government chooses to put in place more 
liberal or conservative human rights policies. For example, perhaps unex-
pectedly, the Chinese government has taken steps in recent years to control its 
use of the death penalty, leading to a 75% decline in convictions from 2002 
to 2013 (The Diplomat, 2014). According to Kinzelbach (2014), public 
uproar at high-profile wrongful executions has been the driving force behind 
these changes. She points to the case of Nie Shubin, who was exonerated of 
the killing of Kang Juhua when another man confessed his guilt—10 years 
after Nie was executed. The public outcry, media coverage, and mobilization 
of the legal community sparked a chain of events that led to reforms in crimi-
nal justice policy.
Making a target country’s citizens more aware and concerned that their 
government is abusing their human rights is one important means by which 
international activism helps domestic movements pressurize governments to 
change their policies (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999). 
Hendrix and Wong (2013) argue that foreign naming and shaming will be 
most effective in authoritarian states, precisely because in such an informa-
tion-scarce environment, foreign condemnation will have a comparatively 
large impact in letting citizens and activists know that their rights are being 
violated. But target governments are also actors when facing foreign pres-
sure, and authoritarian rulers can take steps to manipulate any information 
about pressure that reaches their people. And scholars have very little under-
standing of whether, and in what form, international pressure actually reaches 
citizens living under authoritarian rule. Without a full account of what actu-
ally happens to information about international pressure in autocracies, and 
how the information affects citizens’ willingness to oppose oppressive gov-
ernment policies, we are missing an important part of the puzzle of how inter-
national actors can affect autocratic behavior.2
I assume that authoritarian regimes have some control over information 
coming in from abroad and want their public to hear only information that 
does not reduce their support for the government. Many instances of human 
rights pressure will have the expected effect of increasing citizens’ dissatis-
faction with the conditions in their country (Davis, Murdie, & Steinmetz, 
2012) and the target regime will, therefore, censor information about that 
pressure. However, when they hear pressure that looks like it is deliberately 
targeting their nation’s geopolitical standing, citizens will consider the human 
rights issue in terms of defending this standing, rather than in regard to the 
rights violations themselves. This will make them more likely to believe that 
human rights are good enough in their country and less likely to support 
efforts to change their government’s behavior. This threat will be particularly 
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salient when pressure comes from a hostile geopolitical rival and the govern-
ment will actively pass on this information to its public.
I find support for this “internationalizing” model of human rights.3 Not 
only does Chinese state media report a surprisingly high amount of sensitive 
foreign pressure on to its public, but it also primarily does so when that pres-
sure comes from the United States, China’s major geopolitical opponent, 
especially when tensions are high. Articles actively link the criticism to this 
geopolitical competition. A survey experiment shows that reading pressure 
from the United States over women’s rights makes respondents significantly 
more likely to believe that those rights are respected well enough in China 
and significantly less willing to sign petitions to call for improvements. These 
effects can be eliminated when people are informed that pressure explicitly 
targets the Chinese government, rather than the country as a whole. Pressure 
from a neutral source, the African Union (AU), however, sees no effects in 
either direction.
This study provides a plausible account for why authoritarian regimes 
might continue to maintain broad public support for their behavior in the face 
of international opprobrium and shows that, in China at least, 30 years of 
foreign efforts may have contributed to citizens holding fewer grievances 
over their human rights.
Authoritarian States and Foreign Pressure
How do authoritarian regimes deal with information about foreign pressure 
on their human rights? For traditional theories of authoritarian politics, infor-
mation that criticizes the regime is damaging for the country’s leaders as it 
will make dissent public and increase the likelihood that others will also 
become emboldened to oppose the regime (Anderson, Regan, & Ostergard, 
2002; Kuran, 1991). In these accounts, the goal is to “make the sum total of 
available public expression more favorable to those in power” (King, Pan, & 
Roberts, 2013, p. 2) and censor any dissenting voices, domestic or foreign. 
According to Freedom House, part of what makes regimes authoritarian is 
that they “censor or punish criticism of the state.”4
This is also a premise of theories of how transnational activism and inter-
national pressure can influence human rights.5 The greater the negative infor-
mation about a government that reaches the public from outside actors, the 
more likely people will be to support efforts to change government policies.6 
As foreign pressure tells people that their country does not respect human 
rights, and denounces it for doing so, their grievances about human rights 
conditions in their country increase after hearing it. As grievances grow, this 
will “empower and legitimate the claims of domestic opposition groups 
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against norm-violating governments” (Risse et al., 1999, p. 5), mobilizing 
them against the regime. Davis and colleagues (2012) and Ausderan (2014) 
demonstrate that, cross-nationally, foreign shaming does indeed make a 
country’s citizens less likely to believe their government respects human 
rights the following year.7
Powerful repressive and censorship apparatuses mean that authoritarian 
regimes like the CCP can exert strong control over this information. While 
concerned “netizens” can relatively easily uncover foreign human rights 
pressure through virtual private networks or access to English language web-
sites (Roberts & Stewart, n.d.; Shirk, 2011; Timmons, 2015), efforts to com-
pletely censor some prominent human rights issues, such as the Nobel Peace 
Prize given to Liu Xiaobo in 2010, demonstrate that authorities can often 
successfully prevent the majority of their citizens from hearing any offending 
foreign pressure.
And as Table 1 shows, the intense shaming of the 1990s had little effect on 
Chinese citizens, who in 2001 had the second most positive perceptions of 
human rights conditions of the countries surveyed.8
However, recent studies of authoritarian politics in China have indicated 
that the regime takes a more sophisticated approach to censorship. King 
et al.’s (2013) influential analysis finds that, contrary to traditional theories, 
the CCP does permit social media criticism of the government as long as this 
criticism does not promote social mobilization. The implicit assumption is 
that the costs to the CCP of carrying out censorship are greater than the poten-
tial damage done from allowing the public to hear criticism. Jones-Rooy 
(n.d.), Roberts and Stewart (n.d.), and Chen and Xu (2017) have argued that 
with the growth of the Internet, many citizens of authoritarian countries are 
already aware of some high-profile news stories, including prominent foreign 
criticism of human rights in their own country. If state media does not men-
tion this criticism, it may lose credibility, making it less effective as a trusted 
propaganda tool. Preemptively addressing the issue in state media avoids this 
risk and allows the regime to frame the discussion the way it wants. In this 
account, the more “high-profile” the foreign pressure, the more likely it 
should be reported in Chinese media.
A second approach from the literature on authoritarian resilience argues 
that autocrats may permit public protests or social media criticism because 
learning about public discontent provides a way for them to gain information 
about that discontent before it spirals into large-scale mobilization (Lorentzen, 
2013, 2014). Others have proposed that permitting criticism also signals that 
the government is willing to listen to citizens’ concerns, making rulers appear 
more responsive (Plantan & Cairns, 2017). It is not clear how this would 
extend to foreign criticism as leaders presumably have little need to signal 
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responsiveness to foreign critics and will already be aware of the criticism 
before passing it on to a domestic audience.
Similarly, Chen and Xu (2017) argue that rulers may allow their citizens 
to freely discuss sensitive issues if they believe that enough of the population 
already support government policy. In this way, potential opponents may find 
out that a large proportion of the public hold views that conflict with their 
own, dissuading them from collective action. But while this desire to increase 
the preponderance of proregime voices might explain why a regime would 
report heavily on foreign praise for human rights in their country, it makes the 
decision to allow critical foreign voices to enter the public discourse appear 
even more puzzling.
A final, more duplicitous, possibility is that permitting the public to hear 
human rights criticism may be an underhand way for elites to criticize their 
own country’s leadership. If true, media should primarily report foreign criti-
cism when the propaganda chief is from a political faction different from the 
current leader. In China, in recent years, for example, there have been reported 
tensions between Xi Jinping and his propaganda chief, Liu Yunshan, an ally 
of former leader Jiang Zemin.
Table 1. Human Rights Perceptions 2000 to 2004.
Country
Respect for human 
rights in country  
(% say positive—% say 
negativea)
Total Newsweek and 
Economist articles on human 
rights in country from 1990 
to 2000b
1. Canada 66 4
2. China 64 53
3. Philippines 58 8
4. Sweden 50 5
5. United States 48 72
— — —
— — —
27. Algeria −27 15
28. Zimbabwe −33 20
29. Macedonia −36 8
30. Turkey −41 43
31. Argentina −55 8
a. Countries in the World Values Survey, from 2000 to 2004. “How much respect is there 
for individual human rights nowadays in [. . .]” (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). b. Proxy for 
international attention on human rights.
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A Theory of Citizens’ Responses to International 
Pressure
A common thread in these arguments is that criticism itself is damaging for 
the regime. This damage may not be great enough to worry about, or may be 
outweighed by the benefits from being seen to report it, but the assumption 
is that all else being equal, rulers would rather their population not hear dis-
paraging remarks about their rule. In this view, citizens are rational Bayesian 
updaters (Gerber & Green, 1999), taking in information from credible 
sources that human rights are not well respected in their country and down-
grading their views about human rights conditions. They will then be more 
likely to support domestic activism and challenge their government over 
these conditions.
But citizens are not always rational actors. They bring their own biases 
and motivations, which may influence how they respond to new information 
about their country. If we are to fully understand the impacts of international 
pressure, we need to examine how individuals actually respond to critical 
information and what this means for their support for their government’s 
actions. Studies of transnational persuasion have shown that people may not 
act in a Bayesian manner, but instead rely on their own partisan political 
identities to cue how they interpret foreign comments (Bush & Jamal, 2014; 
Dragojlovic, 2015; Hayes & Guardino, 2011). Marinov (n.d.), for example, 
shows that disparaging foreign comments about democracy in Turkey could 
downgrade people’s beliefs about freedoms in the country—but only if those 
comments were supported by their partisan political elites.
However, in autocracies like China with few political parties, partisan 
political identities are not the clear identity markers that they might be in the 
United States or Turkey. Pan and Xu (n.d.) argue that there is little clear 
political polarization in the country due to the lack of political opposition 
and, as a result, the ideological spectrum in the country “does not delineate a 
cleavage between those who support regime policies and those who oppose 
them” (p. 1). Instead, the main source of group identity is the nation: In the 
2012 World Values Survey, 98% of Chinese citizens said that they saw them-
selves as part of the Chinese nation, while 90% said they were proud of their 
country.9 According to Rosen and Fewsmith (2001), nationalist sentiments 
are some of the main ways through which citizens express their opinions in 
public in China.
In countries like China, people’s attachment to their nation is likely to be 
a major factor in determining their response to foreign pressure. According to 
social identity theory, part of a person’s self-concept comes from his or her 
membership in this kind of social group (Tajfel, 1978). The theory argues that 
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people wish to maintain a positive image of their group in relation to other 
groups to maintain their self-esteem (Abrahms & Hogg, 1988; Rubin & 
Hewstone, 1998; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986), such that “the better one’s 
group looks in comparison with other groups, the more status the group gains, 
and the more self-esteem it can provide for its members” (Morton, Postmes, 
Haslam, & Hornsey, 2009, p. 661).
People are therefore motivated to defend their group against anything that 
might threaten that positive comparison (Sherman & Kim, 2005; Steele, 
1988). One direct way in which the group’s image (and its members’ self-
esteem) may be threatened is through information that frames the group in a 
bad light. International pressure on one’s nation’s human rights situation may 
do precisely this, by suggesting that the nation does not respect human rights, 
and that other countries or organizations disapprove of its actions.
In this case, when citizens hear criticism of their country’s treatment of its 
minority groups, for example, this may evoke not just concerns about minor-
ity rights, but also concerns that the country is being denigrated internation-
ally. To defend their country (and their self-worth) from this kind of threat, 
group members have a number of options. One way is through defensive 
biases in how they process the threatening information (Sherman & Cohen, 
2002). According to the theory of motivated reasoning, people do not just 
look to form accurate opinions, but also opinions that fit a particular self-
interested goal, such as maintaining a positive self-image (Kunda, 1990; 
Taber & Lodge, 2006). Extensive scholarship has shown that people undergo 
“biased assimilation” of new information to fit it to their partisan prior beliefs 
(Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Kunda, 1990; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979) 
and the prevalent beliefs of their social group (Bolsen, Druckman, & Cook, 
2014; Druckman, Peterson, & Slothuus, 2013; Taber & Lodge, 2006).
Others have shown how people are “emotionally” motivated to interpret 
new information in ways that defends their group’s image (Green et al., 2004; 
Nyhan & Reifler, 2015; Sherman & Cohen, 2002; Steele, 1988). On hearing 
information that threatens the positive image of their social group, people 
disregard any desire to form accurate opinions, and instead reject the infor-
mation (De Hoog, 2013). If the threatening information comes from outsid-
ers, people may be even more likely to reject it (Hornsey, Trembath, & 
Gunthorpe, 2004). This effect appears to be limited to critical information 
(people are no more likely to believe praise from ingroups than outgroups), 
leading Hornsey and colleagues (2004) to argue that group-based criticisms 
are a “unique subset of persuasive messages in the sense that they directly 
threaten the (collective) self-concept” (p. 501).
Patriots rejecting out of hand information that criticizes their nation is, 
perhaps, not surprising. However, importantly, studies have also shown that 
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on encountering information that threatens their preexisting beliefs or group 
image, people do not merely reject the information, but also spend longer 
time processing it, taking time to develop counterarguments (De Hoog, 2013; 
Taber & Lodge, 2006). De Hoog (2013) shows that on reading a passage that 
criticized their social group, people who identified with that group perceived 
the information to be more threatening and spent considerably longer time 
reading the passage. By developing these counterarguments, people may 
develop stronger opinions in the opposite direction, in what is known as a 
“boomerang” or “backfire” effect. A number of authors have shown that upon 
encountering information incongruent with their prior opinions, people may 
hold their original belief even more strongly (Lodge & Taber, 2000; Nyhan & 
Reifler, 2010; Nyhan, Reifler, & Udan, 2013; Redlawsk, 2002; Taber & 
Lodge, 2006). Schaffner and Roche (2016) find, for example, that Republicans 
surveyed following news of the drop in the unemployment rate in 2012 
believed that the level of unemployment was higher than those surveyed 
before the news.
This backfire effect may be particularly strong when people encounter 
information that directly threatens their social group. Trevors, Muis, Pekrun, 
Sinatra, and Winne (2016) find that people feel confusion and frustration 
when they encounter information that challenges a valued part of their iden-
tity, and that the backfire effect in response to this challenging information 
comes as a direct result of these negative emotions. For human rights pres-
sure, this implies that when citizens hear that their country has been denounced 
over its human rights conditions, if they feel the need to defend against the 
threat to their nation’s image, then they may develop counterarguments, 
thinking through reasons for why human rights are in fact well respected at 
home, and as a result become more likely to believe that human rights are 
indeed well respected.
When do people respond to critical information as rational actors, and 
when does pressure backfire in this manner? Nyhan and Reifler (2015) 
acknowledge that the backfire effect in response to the correction of misper-
ceptions is itself rare and has only been documented on certain issues, what 
they call the most “affect-laden” issues. It is only on controversial topics that 
have come to symbolically represent bipartisan competition in the United 
States, like the war in Iraq (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010) or the Affordable Care Act 
(Nyhan, Reifler, & Ubel, 2013)—topics that people see in terms of their parti-
san disagreements, not the content of the issues themselves—that partisans 
strengthen their misperceptions. On matters less clearly linked to this competi-
tion, people generally act in a Bayesian fashion (Wood & Porter, 2016).
In the same way, I argue that in most cases citizens do indeed interpret 
human rights pressure in terms of the human rights issue being discussed. 
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They respond as rational Bayesian updaters to the information that human 
rights are not well respected, becoming more likely to believe that those 
rights need to be improved. However, when there is a salient link between the 
pressure and citizens’ sense of their country’s standing in geopolitical compe-
tition, citizens consider the issue not just in terms of the content of the human 
rights issues themselves, the individual injustices or repression, but also in 
terms of a threat to their nation’s standing. This should be especially likely 
when the pressure appears to be part of a deliberate attempt to denigrate the 
nation. If this occurs, then the sense of threat to their own self-worth is acti-
vated, and so is the need to fight back. They develop counterarguments 
against this threat and, as a result, become more positive about their country’s 
human rights.
One way in which this sense of geopolitical competition will be particu-
larly salient is if human rights pressure comes from a source that is a major 
geopolitical rival. As Rousseau (1999) shows, people’s attention to relative 
versus absolute gains increases significantly when they are considering states 
that are economic or military opponents. Pressure on the Soviet Union from 
the United States would have been intimately tied to relative standings in 
Cold War competition, in a way that pressure from Cuba would not. Pressure 
from a geopolitical rival like the United States would have been more likely 
to appear hostile, a deliberate attempt to use the pressure to denigrate the 
Soviet nation and its image, to bring the country down in Cold War competi-
tion. The threat to the nation’s image becomes particularly clear and salient, 
and so does the need to fight back, to defend against this attempt to denigrate 
the nation. This threat will also vary over time, as the rivalry increases and 
decreases in intensity. If the Soviet Union were involved in an ongoing con-
flict or geopolitical dispute with the United States, then international compe-
tition would have been even more salient, pressure would have been seen as 
even more hostile, and should have evoked an even greater backfire effect. If 
relations were benign, then this sense of hostility (and therefore the backfire 
effect) should have been lower.
This argument implies that authoritarian rulers have incentives to “inter-
nationalize” human rights violations—to make their public interpret informa-
tion about those violations in terms of defending their nation. Leaders 
therefore have incentives to use their control of state media to strategically 
pass on pressure from geopolitical rivals, especially when that rivalry is most 
hostile, and to censor pressure from other sources.
Hypothesis 1a: Authoritarian regimes will be more likely to allow their 
public to hear information about international pressure from major geopo-
litical rivals than from neutral sources.
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Hypothesis 1b: Authoritarian regimes will be more likely to allow their 
public to hear information about international pressure from major geopo-
litical rivals when the rivalry is most hostile, and less likely to do so when 
relations are benign.
Reporting Foreign Pressure in the People’s Daily
I examine the case of China, a one-party state with a powerful censorship 
apparatus. According to Shambaugh (2007, p. 28), “virtually every con-
ceivable medium which transmits and conveys information to the people 
of China falls under the bureaucratic purview of the CCP Propaganda 
Department.” I examine how the CCP deals with foreign pressure in its 
state newspaper outlet the People’s Daily, a tightly controlled government 
mouthpiece that Xi Jinping has called “the Party’s battle position.”10 As 
such, we can be confident that any news contained within it has been 
approved by the Propaganda Department for dissemination to the public 
(Stockmann, 2013).
My universe of cases is all international pressure on human rights in China 
from 1979 to 2011,11 from which I draw a sample of 1,337 separate instances 
(taken from English language sources—I address this bias below). For my 
dependent variable, I searched for whether each of these 1,337 instances was 
reported in the People’s Daily between 1979 and 2011.12 A surprisingly large 
228 instances were reported in the paper, ranging from 0 to 12 reports for 
each instance. This means that after 1989 even Chinese citizens who only 
read state newspapers would be consistently aware of foreign pressure on 
their country’s human rights record.
I split the data into three main groups: pressure originating from the United 
States, other non-U.S. Western sources,13 and non-Western sources.14
My prediction is that pressure from the United States should be most 
likely to be reported, followed by non-U.S. Western sources (while part of the 
“West” they are not direct rivals of China in the same way as the United 
States). Pressure from non-Western sources should be the least likely to be 
reported as these are generally either geopolitical allies or less powerful. 
Pressure is less likely to arise from these sources in the first place and, 
because of the use of English-language sources, may be underrepresented in 
the database. However, if anything, we might expect that only including the 
most prominent instances of pressure from these sources (that has reached 
English-language media) should bias my results in the opposite direction; 
their relative prominence should make them more likely to be reported in the 
People’s Daily. This leaves two “non-national” groups, the UN, and interna-
tional NGOs, which I test separately.
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I estimate the data using logistic regression models, as the outcome vari-
able is either reported (1) or not (0). I estimate versions of the following 
equation:
Report =a+b Source +b Territorial +b Type +b NewYorkTimes 1 2 3 4 +e
Controls
To test whether the international prominence of the news is responsible, I 
include a control for whether the pressure has been reported in the New York 
Times, a plausible measure for the level of international coverage. Second, 
some pressure should be harder to internationalize—make citizens think 
about geopolitical rivalry rather than the content of the human rights viola-
tion—than others. It should be particularly difficult to minimize the specific, 
damaging, content of foreign pressure when that pressure itself reveals new, 
specific information about the issues, such as individuals tortured or protes-
tors killed. On the contrary, general pressure that references generic govern-
ment failings over human rights will be much more weakly tied to the 
content of individual violations and therefore much more easy to link to 
geopolitical competition. “Specific” pressure is also likely to provide new 
information about an issue that, maybe, citizens did not know much about 
before, while “general” pressure is likely to provide little new information. 
The CCP should see far more positive effects from passing on “general” 
pressure than “specific” pressure.
I make one further distinction. Hendrix and Wong (2013) argue that for 
“overt” issues that people already know about, like the one-child policy or 
gender equality, foreign condemnation is likely to be less damaging for 
authoritarian states as the violation itself is already in the public eye and 
indeed may be explicit government policy. Just like “general” pressure, 
“overt” pressure is less likely to provide new information, and the CCP will 
face fewer costs from passing it on to the public. I test this prediction here 
and, as the types of pressure may be correlated with the source, also test 
using fixed effects by type.
Results
As expected by the “high-profile” argument, pressure reported in the NYT 
was almost twice as likely to be reported in Chinese state media as less prom-
inent pressure.15 Even controlling for prominence in foreign media, however, 
pressure that originated from the United States was significantly more likely 
to be reported, as much as 118% more likely than pressure from other Western 
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sources. While pressure from other Western sources was sometimes reported, 
pressure from non-Western countries was barely reported at all (8.9% as 
likely as U.S. sources and 19.3% as likely as other Western sources, see 
Figure 1). These results all hold when using fixed effects.16 As shown in 
Figure 2 overt and general pressure were significantly more likely to be 
reported, with only 0.4% of instances of specific pressure featuring in the 
People’s Daily.17
Discriminating by Source
The CCP response in the periods after domestic crackdowns demonstrates the 
importance of the source of pressure. In 1989, countries across the world 
issued strongly worded protests against the violence on June 4. However, the 
Chinese state media focused almost purely on the criticisms from the United 
States. The first reports concerned President Bush’s statements about the 
massacre, the sanctions applied on China, and the refuge of dissident Fang 
Lizhi in the U.S. embassy (People’s Daily, 1989a; 1989b; 1989c). This theme 
continued over the following weeks, with articles about foreign pressure 
almost universally featuring only pressure arising from the United States.
In 2008, critical reactions also arose across the globe, but again Chinese 
state media attention focused heavily on the U.S. response. Reports in the 
People’s Daily noted House speaker Nancy Pelosi’s stated support for the 
Dalai Lama (People’s Daily, 2008a), Tibet resolutions in the House of 
Figure 1. Predicted probability of pressure reported in People’s Daily, by source.
95% confidence intervals.
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Representatives (People’s Daily, 2008b), as well as purported media bias 
from CNN and the BBC (People’s Daily, 2008a). The United States was 
joined as a hostile protagonist in the Chinese media by France, viewed as 
particularly hostile to China because of an attack on the Olympic torch relay 
in Paris by pro-Tibet protestors. Reports of French criticism focused on 
President Sarkozy’s statement that he may not attend the upcoming Beijing 
Olympics and launched stinging critiques of French motives (People’s Daily, 
2008c; 2008d). These reports and attacks on the relay contributed to public 
calls for a boycott of French goods in China. Yet Sarkozy was not the most 
outspoken in his comments on Tibet and the Olympics. Polish leaders were 
the first to threaten a boycott (Polskie Radio, 2008), joined by Angela 
Merkel in Germany (The Guardian, 2008); yet neither piece of pressure was 
reported in China.
Perhaps chastened by the Chinese public’s response, after the Urumqi 
violence in July 2009, Western criticism was much more equivocal. While 
some leaders appealed for calm (Agence France-Presse, 2009), the most 
explicit censure came from Islamic sources. The Turkish government (BBC, 
2009a), Iranian newspapers (BBC, 2009b), and Azerbaijani politicians 
(BBC, 2009c) all harshly criticized Beijing, with Turkish ministers calling 
the subsequent crackdown “genocide” (Blanchard & Lim, 2009). The 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation complained vehemently about the 
“disproportionate use of force.”18 None of these criticisms were reported in 
Figure 2. Predicted probability of pressure reported in People’s Daily, by type.
95% confidence intervals.
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Chinese state media, however, which having realized it had a receptive 
audience, limited its reports to again attack French and American media for 
their coverage of the clashes (Beijing Daily, 2009). In each case, there was 
plenty of prominent non-Western criticism of Chinese activities, but state 
media almost exclusively reported pressure from sources perceived to be 
hostile to China.
Low and High Tensions
To account for “hostile” China–U.S. relations, I create a moving sum for 
whether there has been a geopolitical incident between the United States and 
China in the previous 28 days.19 To account for “benign” relations, I create a 
moving sum for whether there has been an official visit by Chinese leaders or 
foreign ministers to the United States in the previous 28 days. As Nitsch 
(2007) notes, one purpose of official visits to another state is to improve bilat-
eral relations, and I assume that the CCP will therefore strive to keep bilateral 
relations more positive after the visits and portray them positively to the pub-
lic. I then test whether People’s Daily reports of pressure from the United 
States are higher in these periods. I estimate the data using a time series 
model,20 using versions of the following equation:
Report =a+b USIncident +b Bilateralvisit
+
t 1 t-1, t-29 2 t-1, t-29
b InternationalPressure +b Controls  
+ la
3 t-1, t-29 4 t-1, t-29
g 7 + f Time  +e( ) ( )
Controls
I first control for a moving sum of the amount of U.S. pressure leading up to 
the reports, and the level of foreign news (number of reports in the New York 
Times) about U.S. pressure, over the previous 28 days. As reporting foreign 
pressure may be a consequence of domestic conditions in China, I include 
controls containing 28-day moving sums for the level of social unrest and 
regime repression using the Global Database of Events, Language, and 
Tone. I also include the period of the annual meetings of the National 
People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Constitutive Consultative 
Conference, which may see increased domestic and international scrutiny. 
Finally, I include a control for the date to account for increased availability 
of information through technological development.
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Results
The tenor of bilateral relations with the United States strongly influences how 
American human rights pressure is reported in Chinese media. In the 28 days 
following geopolitical incidents, the People’s Daily on average reports an 
impressive 419% more pressure from the United States compared with other 
28-day periods. Pressure that did not come from the United States showed no 
difference. However, in the 28 days following official Chinese visits to the 
United States, the People’s Daily on average reports 166% less pressure from 
the United States than at other times.22
And at times of high bilateral tension Chinese state media has actively 
sought to link U.S. human rights pressure to the country’s aggression against 
China. After the United States bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 
1999, for example, the barrage of anti-American propaganda in the Chinese 
media included extensive reports of how the United States was continuing to 
criticize Chinese human rights. The reports included both new pressure from 
the United States—a congressional resolution to commemorate the anniver-
sary of Tiananmen Square23 (something otherwise rarely discussed in Chinese 
media)—and also referenced old efforts to condemn China over its rights 
situation (People’s Daily, 1999a). The reports were seemingly designed to 
link the attempts to denounce the CCP over human rights with a physical 
attack on Chinese property and civilians, both incidents reinforcing the idea 
that the United States is set on “undermining China’s stability” (People’s 
Daily, 1999b). In some reports, this link was made explicit. The People’s 
Daily (1999b) article on the Tiananmen Square resolution, published a few 
weeks after the bombing, reads,
They fly the flag of so-called “human rights,” “democracy,” and “freedom” in 
order to interfere in others’ internal affairs and trample upon their sovereignty, 
in order to impose their social system and values onto other countries and 
dominate the world. US actions in Yugoslavia fully illustrate this point.
Reports from non-Western sources, when they are featured in Chinese media, 
are generally still portrayed as driven by the U.S. drive to attack China. UN 
human rights draft resolutions that targeted China, for instance, were so 
prominent in international media in the 1990s that they invariably also fea-
tured in Chinese state media. While the resolutions often included numerous 
non-Western signatories, and were regularly led by European countries, 
Chinese media condemned each one as driven by the United States in a pre-
dictable “anti-China attempt,” a pretext to prevent China’s rise (People’s 
Daily, 1996; 1998a, 1998b, 1998c).
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Internationalizing Human Rights
The prominence of human rights pressure in international media does not 
fully explain why Chinese state media reports on certain kinds of pressure but 
censors others. If state media is just reporting cases they believe the people 
will find interesting or have already heard, this does not tell us why some of 
the most high-profile and dramatic pieces of foreign pressure are not reported, 
such as the accusation of “genocide” from Turkish ministers. There are also 
cases of obscure pressure reported to the whole Chinese population by the 
People’s Daily that are barely reported in international outlets, cases that even 
interested Chinese citizens would be unlikely to otherwise pick up on. The 
2012 HRW report discussed earlier is just an example of highly sensitive 
pressure on human rights in China that barely caused a stir internationally, 
but was discussed in great detail across Chinese state media.24
In 2016, Ilham Tohti, an imprisoned Uighur academic, was given the Martin 
Ennals Prize for human rights. While news of the prize was scarce even in 
international press agencies, the CCP allowed domestic media to play up the 
news, Xinhua (2016) calling it a “blasphemy and mockery of human rights,” 
and the Global Times (2016) fulminating that the West was using the issue to 
“tear up” China. Indeed in recent years, news of arrests and sentences of law-
yers and dissidents have often been introduced to the people by referencing 
unheralded Western criticism. In August 2017, an People’s Daily (2017) edito-
rial trawled through former Hong Kong Chief Executive Chris Patten’s rela-
tively obscure condemnations of the rule of law in the city from more than 2 
months before as a way of justifying the recent sentencing of democracy activ-
ists, calling the comments an attack by “foreign anti-China forces.”
The findings also cast doubt upon the “factional” explanation. Pressure 
was reported in the People’s Daily equally heavily under Jiang Zemin from 
1992 to 2002 (see Figure 3), who had few obvious conflicts with his propa-
ganda chief, Ding Guangen. Factional differences also do not explain why 
state media has reported U.S. pressure in such disparaging terms.
However, the finding that state media takes obscure pieces of American 
human rights pressure and passes it on to its entire public does not prove the 
argument of this piece: that the CCP is doing so because this pressure makes 
its public more satisfied with the government. In the absence of direct evi-
dence about CCP leaders’ true intentions, a key implication of the argument 
is that American pressure should indeed reduce Chinese public grievances 
about human rights. To test this, I employed an online survey experiment that 
randomly exposed Chinese citizens to different types of pressure on women’s 
rights, before testing their grievances about the state of women’s rights in the 
country.
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Women’s Rights
Research ethics determined the choice of women’s rights. The research envi-
ronment in China prohibits surveys on more sensitive human rights topics, and 
there is an obligation to respondents to ensure that they are not asked questions 
where their answers may put them at risk. The CCP has, since its inception, 
portrayed itself as a liberator of women (Mao, 1955) and as a result the issue 
is relatively freely discussed in traditional and social media. This relative free-
dom also means that social censure is less of a concern and, in previous sur-
veys, Chinese citizens have been unafraid to show their concerns over gender 
equality—In one recent survey, 73% of women said they were dissatisfied 
with the status of women in the country.25 Social desirability should also not 
affect how participants respond to the experimental manipulations.
International and domestic attention on women’s rights in China has 
increased dramatically since March 2015, when feminist activists were 
arrested and held without trial for a month. Condemnations poured forth from 
across the globe (Wee, 2015) and, even after the activists’ release on bail, 
continued throughout the year (Foreign Policy, 2015). The experiment was 
conducted in February 2016, just after the forced closure of Guo Jianmei’s 
high-profile Zhongze women’s legal center, which had symbolized the coun-
try’s growing women’s rights movement. The closure again drew interna-
tional disapproval, with Hillary Clinton tweeting, “Women’s rights are human 
rights. This center should remain—I stand with Guo” (Washington Post, 
2016). Of course, we cannot be sure whether pressure on women’s rights 
Figure 3. Proportion of instances of foreign human rights pressure reported in 
the People’s Daily, 1979 to 2011.
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would evoke the same reaction as pressure on physical rights. It may be that 
people’s reaction to these more “visceral” issues would overwhelm any 
defensive response, so pressure on women’s rights may share more in com-
mon with pressure on other civil and political rights in China.
The survey was conducted with an online sample of 1,200 Chinese peo-
ple from across the country, using the Qualtrics survey provider and panels 
in China. With the exception of age and gender, where respondent numbers 
were weighted to match the overall population, the sample more closely 
resembles the online population—richer, more well-educated and urban,26 
but was drawn from almost all provinces and walks of life. We should not 
neglect these demographic differences, nor that respondents were able to 
choose whether to join a panel, and take part in a survey on “social atti-
tudes” so may be disproportionately interested in social issues in China. 
Nonetheless, I argue that the survey provides a broadly representative sam-
ple of the online population in China. The online population (over 50% of 
the population in mid-2016 (China Internet Watch, 2016)) are arguably the 
most likely to pick up on foreign comments about China, and some have 
argued that among the country’s middle class, political and civil society 
participation is now more likely to be online (Yang, 2009). I test the following 
interlinked hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: International pressure on a country’s human rights that 
comes from geopolitical opponents will reduce citizens’ grievances about 
human rights conditions.
Hypothesis 2b: International pressure on a country’s human rights will be 
more likely to reduce citizens’ grievances about human rights conditions 
when it comes from major geopolitical opponents than when it comes 
from neutral sources.
Respondents were randomly assigned to one of three groups: a control 
group (given no prompt) and two treatment groups who were asked to read a 
short paragraph taken from a recent news item, with only the source varied, 
as follows:27
Yesterday a United States/African Union spokeswoman criticised China’s 
women’s rights conditions. She said: “The Chinese government must improve 
the rights of women in China.”
This kind of brief condemnatory statement is often how human rights 
pressure is presented in international and Chinese media. In its criticism of 
human rights in China in December 2016, for example, the European Union 
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was reported as being “extremely troubled” by the human rights situation in 
China in the headline in Reuters (2016) and merely as having “accused 
China over its human rights” in the Global Times (2016). 
I choose two sources that maximize variation in geopolitical opposition 
with China. The CCP portrays the United States as a major geopolitical rival, 
while the AU (at least before any criticism occurs) is at worst a neutral actor 
for the Chinese people, and at best a geopolitical ally. Since the Maoist 
period, Beijing has portrayed itself as the leader of the developing world, and 
recently the People’s Daily has described the relationship as “friendly” and “a 
community of mutual support” (People’s Daily, 2015). While criticizing 
China may be enough to make the AU no longer seem completely “neutral” 
in the future, I contend that by itself this criticism should not be enough to 
make it appear to be a geopolitical opponent like the United States.
After receiving the treatments, respondents were then questioned on their 
attitudes and beliefs about women’s rights in China, in particular their level 
of agreement with the statement “At present women’s rights in China are not 
good enough” (on a 4-point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree). I 
also ask whether respondents would be willing to sign a petition calling for 
improvements in women’s rights.28 I normalize the outcomes, to measure 
change from the control group.
Results
Pressure from the United States significantly reduced Chinese citizens’ 
grievances about the state of women’s rights in their country in comparison 
with the control group, with an average treatment effect (ATE) of −0.244 (p 
= .02), as shown in Figure 4,29 representing a decrease of around 6.6 percent-
age points. US pressure also significantly reduced grievances in comparison 
to pressure from the African Union (ATE = -0.247 p = 0.021), which itself 
had no effects in either direction compared to the control. US pressure also 
made respondents significantly less willing to sign the petition to improve 
women’s rights in comparison to the control,30 a decrease of around 7.7 per-
centage points.
Mechanisms
If the drop in grievances is due to the feeling of threat to the nation’s image, 
we should find evidence for two observable implications:
National identity. The effect should be greatest in those with the strongest 
national attachment, those whose sense of self-worth is most closely linked to 
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their nation, and should be most likely to feel a sense of threat (De Hoog, 
2013; Steele, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). As expected, there is a significant 
interaction effect between the U.S. treatment and respondents’ preexisting 
level of national pride (on a 1-10 scale), with the backfire effect stronger in 
those with higher national pride.31
Nation and party. Pressure should also only evoke a defensive reaction if it 
appears to directly attack the nation and its status. If citizens can lay the 
blame of human rights violations purely at the hands of their leaders, then 
they may dismiss pressure as an attack on those leaders, rather than on their 
nation’s image: to blame it on the ruling CCP, not the Chinese nation as a 
whole. To test this, for those groups who had earlier received information 
about pressure, at the end of the survey I include a sentence that reads, “The 
spokeswoman continued: ‘Rather than the Chinese people, it is the Chinese 
government that has not ensured women’s rights are good enough.’” Respon-
dents were then asked again about their grievances on women’s rights in 
China.32
Strikingly, I find that when people are explicitly told that the pressure they 
heard from the United States actually targets only the CCP leaders and not the 
Chinese people, the counterproductive effects vanish, as shown in Figure 5. 
The ATE is now 0.024 (p = .768) against the control.
Figure 4. Influence of treatments on grievances over women’s rights (higher 
score means higher grievances, normalized—dotted line is control, 95% confidence 
intervals).
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Alternative Explanations
As expected by the partisan “cues” argument, those who are more satisfied 
with the CCP are also the most likely to react negatively to pressure from the 
United States.33 There is no such interactive effect after hearing pressure 
from the AU however, difficult to explain with a cues account. Moreover, in 
the cues theory, pressure that only targets the government elites should be an 
even stronger cue for government supporters, and should therefore make 
them become even more likely to be satisfied with how they are treated. But 
as shown, when pressure is directed at the government alone, the effect disap-
pears. The difference in responses between those satisfied with the regime 
and those less satisfied with the regime also disappears. This suggests 
strongly that it is people’s national identity, rather than any political identity, 
that is behind the counterproductive effect.
A more pressing concern is that there are other relevant differences 
between the United States and the AU, other than competition and perceived 
hostility to China. Two plausible reasons for respondents to reject pressure 
from the United States but not the AU are a general anti-Americanism and 
that the United States is acting hypocritically in criticizing China over human 
rights. A closer look at the results suggests that anti-Americanism is not the 
main cause. The effect appears to be driven if anything by pro-Americanism, 
with those who have a positive attitude toward the United States as a whole 
Figure 5. Impact of targeting elites only on grievances over women’s rights 
(higher score means higher grievances, normalised- dotted line is control, 95% 
confidence intervals).
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more likely to be affected.34 The negative reaction appears to come not from 
attitudes to the United States, but beliefs about the U.S. government’s 
approach to China. I find that those who distrust the U.S. government’s China 
policy have significantly fewer grievances about women’s rights having 
heard pressure from the United States35.
This claim is further supported by in-depth interviews carried out with 100 
Chinese citizens in spring 2016. Interviewees were approached at random in 
public places, and the sample was balanced according to gender and age, to 
match the survey and the population at large.36 As with the survey, interview-
ees were randomly exposed to pressure from the United States and AU on 
women’s rights in China and spoke through the logic behind their responses 
in detail. Interviewees were in general highly critical of comments about 
China originating from the United States. Many said that they believed the 
United States would only make these comments to try and “attack” China.
The comments were viewed through the prism of international relations, 
rather than as legitimate concerns about human rights. Very few mentioned 
any dislike of the United States itself. The AU, despite not receiving the same 
kind of vitriol as the United States, was perhaps surprisingly not seen as a 
particularly acceptable source of pressure. While many interviewees viewed 
the organization’s concerns about women in China to be genuine, they often 
dismissed the comments as hypocritical from a continent with its own prob-
lems in gender equality. Hardly any mentioned its distinctive position as an 
international organization. These comments cast doubt on the argument that 
the perceived hypocrisy of the United States is driving the backlash.
Another concern is that respondents may just be giving an immediate 
angry reaction, defensively refuting the pressure, but do not truly believe 
that women’s rights are better. Moreover, people may just form political 
opinions about women’s rights in response to being asked (Zaller, 1992). 
Their response may just be an immediate reaction to American criticism of 
China, rather than anything to do with the issue of women’s rights per se. 
This would mean that the study is not measuring longer term changing 
views, but brief annoyance to the prompt, an objection difficult to refute 
without long-term field experiments. Yet, in interviews, many Chinese citi-
zens did not instinctively dismiss the criticism and sought to justify why 
women’s rights were still well respected in China, pointing to other achieve-
ments or progress over time, providing support for the idea that they were 
actively developing counterarguments. Moreover, the defensive reaction 
does not just appear to be among those who had not thought much about 
women’s rights beforehand, as the effect was equally large, if not larger, 
among young women (the demographic in the control group who believe 
most strongly in equal rights).37
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The brief, stylized nature of the prompt means that it does not incorporate 
the state propaganda and refutations that are often used in real Chinese news 
stories on foreign criticism. On one hand, this means that we need to follow up 
these findings with studies of instances of genuine foreign pressure on China’s 
human rights (as I do, for example, in Gruffydd-Jones, 2017). On the other 
hand, this kind of short extract functions as a hard test for the theory, and 
shows how even a minimal prompt mentioning foreign pressure can affect 
public attitudes, even without accompanying propaganda.38 This helps to dis-
pel one possible counterargument—that it is not the pressure itself that has the 
impact on attitudes, but instead the CCP’s reciprocal attacks on human rights 
in the United States that drives the reduction in grievances about China.39 It 
also shows that it is not just extreme or over-the-top human rights pressure that 
backfires—the pressure in the study is presented soberly and on an issue that, 
in the control, over half of the respondents thought was a problem.40 While it 
is likely that governments’ rhetorical responses to pressure may exacerbate the 
backfire effect, making it appear even more hostile or absurd, this is a question 
for a future project.
Human Rights Pressure Within Authoritarian 
States
We currently have a limited understanding of how foreign human rights pres-
sure matters in authoritarian states. The assumptions from the literatures on 
authoritarian politics and human rights advocacy are that critical information 
increases citizens’ grievances with their government and, all else being equal, 
leaders will look to prevent them from hearing this information.
The developing literature on censorship and authoritarian media has chal-
lenged these traditional views about how autocrats deal with criticism. 
Instead, authors have argued that leaders have various incentives to allow 
their public to hear criticism of their rule: criticism may not be particularly 
damaging without mobilization (King et al., 2013), overzealous censorship 
may impose credibility costs (Chen & Xu, 2017; Jones-Rooy, n.d.; Roberts & 
Stewart, n.d.), criticism may provide credibility benefits from being seen to 
listen to public concerns (Plantan & Cairns, 2017), may reveal valuable infor-
mation about discontent (Lorentzen, 2014), or other citizens’ proregime 
viewpoints (Chen & Xu, 2017). This piece adds to these findings by chal-
lenging their basic assumption—that whatever its side effects, criticism itself 
is inherently damaging. Instead, certain kinds of critical information may 
provide substantial benefits to the regime, perversely increasing rather than 
decreasing public support for the actions being condemned.
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I find that the CCP passes on a surprising amount of foreign criticism on 
highly sensitive human rights issues to its public, particularly when it comes 
from geopolitical opponents like the United States (especially when bilateral 
tensions are high) and addresses general human rights issues or existing gov-
ernment policies. Pressure from neutral non-Western sources is barely 
reported, and nor is pressure that addresses specific human rights violations. 
Evidence from a survey experiment finds, moreover, that pressure from the 
United States makes Chinese citizens significantly more likely to be satisfied 
with the state of women’s rights in their country, something that does not 
arise when pressure comes from a non-Western source. The effect appears to 
arise from people’s attachment to their nation, and belief that the United 
States is hostile toward China, providing support for a national “threat-based” 
rather than partisan “cue-based” account. This is supported further by the 
finding that when people are told the pressure is actually directed only at their 
political leaders, the effect disappears (Figure 6). It is worth noting that this 
impact may be limited to the peculiarities of women’s rights in China, and 
future studies should examine whether the impacts on women’s rights extend 
to pressure on other civil, political, and physical rights, and indeed whether 
the effects found for the online population extend to more rural, older, and 
less internationally oriented citizens.
These findings provide support for a “internationalizing” model: Passing 
on information about foreign pressure helps ensure the public view human 
rights in terms of geopolitical competition, rather than genuine individual 
rights violations, and the process of defending their nation in the face of this 
competition makes them more satisfied with how human rights are dealt with 
at home. Highlighting this information for the public is a way for a regime to 
resist liberalizing reforms or take actions that repress the human rights of its 
people, but continue to retain their support.
Figure 6. Observable implications of “internationalize” model, tested in survey 
experiment.
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Implications for Human Rights Pressure
This implies that public diplomacy designed to pressure authoritarian regimes 
into improving their human rights performance may end up playing into the 
hands of autocrats. In the China case, intense human rights pressure from the 
United States, passed on through state media, may have contributed to the 
Chinese public’s perception that the CCP was respecting human rights. To 
revisit Table 1, Chinese citizens’ lofty opinions of their human rights condi-
tions may not be in spite of international pressure, but partly caused by this 
pressure.
This is important because encouraging a target state’s domestic public to 
oppose its repressive policies is at the heart of how the international commu-
nity looks to counter human rights abuses and encourage long-lasting liberal 
policy changes. Hendrix and Wong (2013) argue that foreign shaming can 
have decisive effects in making domestic audiences in more repressive states 
more critical of rights violations—and for some kinds of foreign shaming this 
may well be the case, if it were to reach the wider public. However, in China 
at least, while much information about foreign shaming does indeed reach the 
public, it is rarely the information that does what Hendrix and Wong suggest. 
Instead, through its control of the media, autocrats only allow their public to 
hear about shaming that has the opposite effect, making citizens less critical 
of rights violations.
This does not necessarily call into question models that extol the virtues of 
external human rights pressure. Indeed, even on the issue of women’s rights, 
many activists have called out to the United States to use its influence to 
publicly shame the Chinese government (Radio Free Asia, 2015). International 
calculations may well have pushed CCP leaders to release the activists on bail 
(Foreign Policy, 2015). This study shows, however, that even in authoritarian 
states, if this kind of human rights pressure is public, then it will have more 
than one audience. These audiences are not just elites and international actors, 
but also everyday citizens and domestic activists, and the impacts on these 
groups may conflict with each other.
This challenges commonly held views about the relationship between 
international pressure “from above” and domestic pressure “from below.” 
According to these views, foreign shaming, threats, and sanctions impose 
costs on governments not only directly, but also indirectly, by working in 
tandem with and providing support to domestic movements. Some scholars 
have advocated for a “comprehensive approach,” which calls for a combina-
tion of these direct and indirect efforts—attacking the elites from above as 
well as encouraging the inculcation of broader public norms (Cardenas, 
2004). The results here, however, show that the two tactics may not work 
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together particularly smoothly. If it can be manipulated by target govern-
ments, then top-down pressure may actively reduce the likelihood that mem-
bers of the public will call out their government on its behavior, or support 
the cause of domestic groups looking to fight human rights violations or illib-
eral policies. In this way, the study responds to Goodman and Jinks’ (2013) 
call for an exploration of how different tactics used by the human rights com-
munity may come into conflict with each other.
For policy makers, this means that there is a danger that even if they suc-
cessfully change autocrats’ behavior in the short term, their work may well be 
reported domestically and give those leaders a propaganda boost. The 
dilemma of how to minimize this boost is an important question for future 
research, but for now, this study provides a plausible starting point: 
International pressure should be led by neutral states or organizations and 
target specific human rights abuses and individual leaders.
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Notes
 1. See http://www.universal-rights.org/human-rights/human-rights-resolutions-portal/ 
and https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2016
 2. By “international pressure” I mean any attempt by foreign actors to change the 
behavior of governments. These actions might include sanctions, threats, or mere 
condemnation.
 3. By “internationalized,” I mean that citizens consider human rights violations not 
as domestic rights violations, but in terms of winning or losing in an interna-
tional, geopolitical rivalry.
 4. https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/worst-worst-2012-worlds-most- 
repressive-societies
 5. Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (1999).
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 6. Davis, Murdie, and Steinmetz (2012), Hendrix and Wong (2013), Krain (2012), 
and Thomas (2001).
 7. In an accompanying experiment, Ausderan provides some individual-level sup-
port for this argument.
 8. It is worth noting that this table does not take into account how different coun-
tries’ citizens interpret these questions in different ways (King & Wand, 2007).
 9. World Values Survey 2012.
10. http://cmp.hku.hk/2016/03/03/39672/
11. See supplementary materials for details of coding.
12. Described in the supplementary materials.
13. If pressure originates from any individual or organization based in those states or 
regions. I discuss further in the supplementary materials.
14. All other countries and regions.
15. p < .001.
16. Figure 2 excludes pressure from the UN and international nongovernmental 
organizations (INGOs). While UN resolutions were reported, nonresolution 
pressure from the UN and pressure from INGOs was barely passed on. See 
Online Appendix 1a.
17. See Online Appendix 2d Table 9. All statistical analysis included in supplemen-
tary materials.
18. http://www.oic-oci.org/topicdetail.asp?tid=256
19. Taken from Weiss (2014)—see Online Appendix.
20. Tests for lag selection suggest that it is optimum to use 7 lags.
21. For details of all controls please see the Online Appendix.
22. The results stand in the face of robustness tests, detailed in the supplementary 
appendix.
23. H. Res.178—https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/106/sres103/text/is
24. Pressure from INGOs is hardly reported before 2011. However, after the Arab 
spring, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) started to view NGOs as catalysts of 
domestic unrest, and stepped up propaganda referring to INGOs as “hostile for-
eign forces” and tools of the United States. Interestingly, from this point, rather 
than being more likely to censor these “dangerous” organizations, the CCP began 
to use state media to regularly pass their criticisms on to the whole population.
25. Accessed at: http://www.genderwatch.cn:801/detail.jsp?fid=305288&cnID=90050
26. See supplementary materials.
27. The randomization procedure was successful (see Online Appendix 2a). There 
are no statistically significant differences in demographic variables or in the pre-
treatment attitudinal questions, with the exception of education, minimally sig-
nificant at the 10% level.
28. This is a rough measure. In reality, petitions in China are unlikely to be on broad 
social issues like women’s rights.
29. I find similar results for three related measures; see Online Appendix 2f.
30. ATE =–0.268, p = 0.015.
31. F = 4.69, p = .031. All interactions see Online Appendix 2e.
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32. I examine this argument more fully in Gruffydd-Jones (2017).
33. F = 4.15, p = .04.
34. F = 6.33, p = .012.
35. F = 7.89, p = .005.
36. This sample is not representative of the Chinese population, especially as it over-
estimates people who visit public places like parks.
37. University-educated respondents are most likely to see a “backfire” effect (F 
= 5.19, p = .023), but I find no interactive effects with any other pretreatment 
questions, including awareness of international news, age, or gender. See Online 
Appendix 2e.
38. Recent studies on China have also employed similar brief vignettes. For exam-
ple, Dafoe and Weiss (n.d.).
39. While this countershaming tactic is occasionally used, in response to the State 
Department’s annual human rights reports, for example, most reports of human 
rights pressure in Chinese media focus on geopolitical rivalry rather than tit-for-
tat accusations.
40. Chinese state media often reports foreign pressure that is earnest and restrained in 
its wording or content, such as that from Human Rights Watch discussed above.
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